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Sensing evil 
Counterterrorism, techno-science, and 
the cultural reproduction of security
Mark Maguire and Pete Fussey
Abstract: New counterterrorism systems are spreading throughout the world. Many 
are based on behavior detection by skilled offi  cers; others deploy techno-scientifi c 
theories and soft ware-mediated environments. All of these systems raise critical 
questions about scientifi c and legal evidence; profi ling, costs, and eff ectiveness. 
However, much of the recent scholarship on this topic is based on secondhand 
information and fails to attend to key transformations in security discourses and in 
practice. Rather than off ering just an overview and theoretical critique, this article 
draws from our ethnographic data on counterterrorism in the UK (with reference 
to the broader global securityscape) and examines the phantasmagoria of fears 
and threats, the experimentations, myriad “expert” theories, and productivity in 
this realm. In doing so, the article examines how, beyond utilitarian notions of 
effi  ciency and security, counterterrorism practices perform multiple cultural roles 
for those charged with its delivery. We discuss particular examples of counterter-
rorism deployments and explore the production of theories about the human in 
security discourses and practices. 
Keywords: abnormal behavior, counterterrorism, (in)securitization, techno-science
Security and insecurity are keywords in the 
contemporary moment. A signifi cant body of 
international scholarship now documents the 
rise and spread of “amorphous” security dis-
courses and practices in domains ranging from 
environmental policy to international relations 
and border control. Anthropologists, who tend 
to form their ethnographic perspectives along-
side populations experiencing insecurity, have 
been quick to challenge these discourses and 
practices, calling attention to the vacuousness 
of the concept and the ramifi cations of security 
in everyday lives (e.g., Goldstein 2012). Th us 
a critical anthropology of security is emerging 
and contributing to broader debates (see Gold-
stein 2010). Th ere is great variety in this grow-
ing area of research, as security and insecurity 
take on diff erent content and have diff erent 
ramifi cations depending on region and context. 
Th at said, some scholars assume the existence of 
a global archipelago of security spaces that bris-
tle with military technologies seamlessly trans-
ported from the martial to the metropolitan 
realms (e.g., Graham 2010). However, (in)se-
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curitization remains uneven, experimental, and 
contested. Th e ethnographic challenge, then, is 
to acknowledge broad drivers, trends, and co-
herencies while also attending to crucial “points 
of emergence or creativity, unexpected con-
junctions or improbable continuums” (Deleuze 
1988: 35). 
Here we do not aim to develop an overarch-
ing theory of security that speaks to all con-
texts globally. Rather, our arguments emerge 
from our independent ethnographic projects on 
counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is but one 
dimension of the varied global securityscape, 
though it has consistently been shown to be a 
signifi cant driver of reasoning and interven-
tions in other domains. During 2011 and early 
2012, Mark Maguire (2014) completed a proj-
ect on counterterrorism in the UK that focused 
on behavioral assessment in ports of entry and 
included basic training, deployments, expert 
literature review, and interviews with key stake-
holders in European and US-based agencies. 
Between 2009 and 2013, Pete Fussey (2013, 
2014) undertook a series of projects involving 
fi eldwork alongside security actors in a variety 
of urban counterterrorism contexts in the UK. 
Th is included analysis of active security envi-
ronments, behavioral detection strategies, and 
threat analysis, including ethnographic research 
into policing and security at the London Olym-
pics. Clearly, for both authors a condition of 
access was an agreement to provide anonymity 
to the organizations from whom it was granted.
Our separate training in and study of coun-
terterrorism exposed not only local institutional 
and contextual factors but also the movement of 
persons, ideas, and ideologues in Euro-Amer-
ican securityscapes, especially vis-à-vis port of 
entry and aviation security. Strikingly, we noted 
the ways in which experts and those at the op-
erational end generally cast themselves as pro-
fessionals combating evildoers. Sometimes jok-
ingly, security operators portrayed themselves 
as the ones “watching the walls” and “protecting 
you while you sleep.” At other times, they spoke 
of the “evil” they were trained to combat. Such 
framings of security and of participants’ roles in 
maintaining it were common. Th ese framings 
play a vital role in animating and legitimating 
the work of security actors as well as construct-
ing perceptions and beliefs about those posing 
a potential threat. However, what is particularly 
interesting here is the range of approaches de-
veloped and deployed to address “evildoers.”
At fi rst glance, then, it is not surprising that 
security professionals would confi gure them-
selves as heroically battling the faceless forces 
of evil. Aft er all, Keith Th omas (1983) famously 
argued that notions of terror and evil were pre-
cisely related to levels of security and control 
over uncertainty. Moreover, the concept of evil 
shows suffi  cient cultural elasticity as to be al-
most empty (Parkin 1985), thus allowing “the 
terrorist” to be situated among Nazi war crimi-
nals, sadistic murderers, or any who might attack 
“civilization.” Nor is it surprising that security 
professionals would confi gure themselves as 
being engaged in a battle armed with particu-
lar knowledge and skills, such as the capacity 
to make use of sharpened senses. What is sur-
prising, however, is the particular ways in which 
security is constructing evil today from within 
professional and expert cultures as well as from 
within counterterrorist techno-science. Th e es-
sential core of the argument here is that contem-
porary security is producing a concept of evil 
both naturalized and politicized through the 
imbrication of (sometimes paradoxical) expert 
constructivist subjectivities and techno-science.
As security operators police the high-tech 
aviation corridors and transportation hubs of 
the “western” world they deploy combinations 
of policing techniques and techno-science. We 
briefl y trace the rise of counterterrorism techno-
science in the Euro-American security milieu, 
with its hyper-rationalized and quantifi ed in-
dicators of abnormal behavior. Alongside these 
means of threat assessment one also fi nds con-
structivist subjectivities—for example, hunches 
and highly intuitive notions of matter out of 
place. It is the coexistence in one milieu of these 
seemingly antagonistic styles of reasoning that 
is of critical importance. Th e simultaneous op-
eration of multiple, contrasting, and contradic-
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tory ways of identifying “evil” points to cultural 
regimes of verediction that underpin suspicion, 
evidence, proportionality, and even probable 
cause. Moreover, we argue that merely by exist-
ing, expert theories and expert knowledge ar-
ticulate a range of performative roles that serve 
to legitimate action and further reinforce con-
structed boundaries of good and evil. However, 
we also argue that one must go beyond accusa-
tions of “security theatre” (Schneier 2003) and 
acknowledge that contemporary securityscapes 
are not just performative spaces but also sites of 
creativity and emergence. 
Below, we explore the rise of counterter-
rorism techno-science, focusing on issues of 
evidence and emergence, experimentation and 
effi  cacy. We then discuss the (seemingly antag-
onistic) “art” of counterterrorism, namely the 
constructivist subjectivities of security opera-
tors, drawing on brief ethnographic moments 
and observations to illustrate the coexistence of 
contradictory styles of reasoning and ways of 
acting. In the third section we analyze a recent 
theoretical contribution to contemporary coun-
terterrorism studies, a text produced by the 
originators of the international programs in 
which we trained and studied. Th is expert text 
explores good and evil, the “abnormal” and 
“emergent,” and is illustrative of how techno-
scientifi c approaches and constructivist subjec-
tivities are held together within a cultural re-
gime of verediction. In our analysis, we draw on 
Foucault (2007) to underscore a shift  from secu-
rity operating as a form of territorial proscrip-
tion to diverse forms of monitoring mobility. 
Such arguments make visible the inauguration 
of new imaginaries and conceptions of security 
into the complex milieus and environments of 
security practice. 
Th e rise of counterterrorism 
techno-science 
Don’t you know that … the villains always 
blink their eyes
—Th e Velvet Underground: Sweet Jane
Th e concept of terrorism has a long and varied 
history, and this history reveals that “the terror-
ist” is a thoroughly cultural fi gure: defi nitions 
of terrorism are vague and oft en meaningless; 
and what is or is not counted as a terrorist act 
is oft en less of an empirical matter and more of 
an illustration of political ideology and propa-
ganda (Sluka 2002). Indeed, “Terrorism comes 
in several varieties. Th ere is ‘wholesale terrorism’ 
targeted against large populations, or ‘retail ter-
rorism’ targeted against individuals. Th ere is state 
terrorism, individual terrorism, or state-spon-
sored terrorism, depending on the agency and 
initiators of the terrorist actions … Th e most 
serious issue, of course, is wholesale terrorism, 
generally state-conducted or state-supported 
(Chomsky 1988: 701).” Of course, Chomsky’s 
core point, and one animating the recent growth 
of “critical terrorism studies” (Jackson et al. 
2009) is that, while the world reacts with horror 
to retail terrorism, many parts of the so-called 
Global South routinely experience state-spon-
sored terrorism. Too oft en terrorist attacks in 
the western world appear magnifi ed, while the 
death toll from state violence elsewhere contin-
ues. Moreover, it should be remembered that the 
overwhelming majority of “terrorist” incidents 
in regions such as Europe do not result from 
actions by international terrorist groups but, 
rather, are acts by so-called residual terrorists: 
far-right groups, separatists, dissident republi-
cans in Northern Ireland, among other persons 
frequently known to the security services, oft en 
at address level. 
However, the events of 11 September 2001, 
together with the anthrax attacks and “shoe-
bomber” attack by Richard Reid soon there-
aft er, gave rise to a particular, contemporary 
problematization of terrorism and to specifi c 
responses by security apparatuses. In these and 
subsequent encounters, terrorists were confi g-
ured as unknown persons with never-before-
seen weapons prepared to die in order to cause 
the maximum loss of life. Security apparatuses 
therefore reconfi gured to prepare for low fre-
quency but potentially catastrophic events. Con-
sequently, counterterrorism work foregrounded 
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the imaginaries of experts, mandated to think the 
impossible and fi nd ways to anticipate and even 
sense actions before they occur. Th ese transfor-
mations are complex and refuse traditional in-
stitution-based analyses. Instead, one must look 
to how broad security apparatuses shape and are 
shaped by contemporary problematizations and 
give rise to specifi c assemblages of governance 
and action. In this section, we aim to explore 
the rise of counterterrorism techno-science: the 
new institutional confi gurations, forms of ex-
pertise, and technology deployments that seek 
to counter the threat of terrorism. We propose 
that counterterrorism techno-science focuses on 
human life itself, building theories and produc-
ing evidence, oft en retrospectively, to counter 
threats in the near future. In particular, we argue 
these are drawn from a range of logics seeking to 
variously identify “abnormality” or “malintent” 
that become translated as attempts to render the 
individual legible.
While many of the following examples are 
drawn from the United States, they are part of a 
more general global transformation of security 
techno-science, which had a particularly signif-
icant moment in the postwar United States. Th e 
most obvious example of all of this is presented 
by the establishment of the US Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in the wake of the 
events of 11 September 2001, a development 
that was part of the most signifi cant reorgani-
zation of US government since World War II. 
Today, the DHS employs a workforce of approx-
imately 230,000 persons and operates with a 
US$38 billion per annum budget, with well over 
US$1 billion expenditure on security science 
and technology (Priest and Arkin 2011). Here, 
as Masco (2014) notes, one may observe the re-
confi guration of the twentieth-century national 
security state as the contemporary counterter-
rorist apparatus—anticipatory, aff ective, bound-
less, and, we add, besotted with techno-science.
Between the contemporary security appara-
tuses and the problematization of unknown ter-
rorist evildoers one now fi nds the extraordinary 
rise of counterterrorist techno-science. Here we 
use the term techno-science in the contemporary 
sense: to elicit the relationality between science, 
technology, and society, their imbricated pro-
cesses, undergirding networks and conditions of 
possibility (Latour 1987). Th is perspective is es-
pecially important here as we are examining the 
ways in which disciplines such as anthropology, 
psychology, and primatology have been har-
nessed to engineering and computer science in 
order to technologically sense human beings at 
an emergent level. Clearly then, counterterror-
ism techno-science is not simply a response to 
delimited security design challenges in airports 
or critical infrastructure sites. Rather, to begin 
to understand counterterrorism techno-science 
one must realize that a broad convergence of 
(scientifi c) disciplinary forms of knowledge and 
experimental technological work is occurring in 
the realm of security. Th e disciplines in play are 
mined for neo-Darwinian insights and broadly 
off er the possibility of predictions about human 
behavior, while the experimental technologies 
at work are from the digital contemporary and 
target human life itself. 
To further understand security techno-sci-
ence one must also attend to the complex and 
transnational web of actors, agencies, institu-
tions, and experts involved, together with the 
objectivist ontological positions that undergird 
it.1 Two examples serve to illustrate. First, aft er 
9/11, the global biometrics industry rapidly ex-
panded to provide imaging and database sys-
tems, together with fi ngerprinting, iris and face 
recognition security “solutions,” among others 
(Maguire 2012). But the past decade has also 
witnessed the rise of so-called second-genera-
tion biometrics that aim to capture more elusive 
dimensions of human life, such as basic emo-
tional states, deception cues, and, potentially, 
emotional signs of hostile intent. Today, in a re-
imagining of centuries-old criminological posi-
tivism, the techno-scientifi c projects emerging 
from homeland security include AVATAR—the 
Automated Virtual Agent for Truth Assessments 
in Real-time, a physiological-behavioral assess-
ment and face-recognition system encased in an 
ATM-sized machine. Th e DHS is also partially 
responsible for the development of Future At-
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tribute Screening Technology (FAST), a mobile 
security environment that persons pass through 
in airports or at mega-events. FAST screens per-
sons using an assemblage of sensors that record 
everything from the skin’s electrical resistance 
to eye movement in order to capture objectiv-
ized signs of “malintent,” or the intention to 
cause harm. 
Th e theory of malintent holds that indi-
viduals who intend to cause harm will display 
particular behavioral and/or physiological cues 
depending on the nature, timing, and conse-
quences of the planned event. And, as we set 
out further below, because the terrorist suspect 
is unknown—as is the nature, timing, and con-
sequences of their near-future actions—malin-
tent is a conceptually vacuous yet nonetheless 
powerful driver of security. Th e theory of mal-
intent off ers a remarkable cultural container that 
serves to both naturalize and politicize terrorism 
at one and the same time. It naturalizes the gen-
erally political act that is terrorism by attempt-
ing to sense an impending action from signals 
emitted by the human body; at the same time, 
it allows for those signals to be the result of po-
litical motivations, and it holds the door open 
for interpretations of those signals to be signs of 
evil—malintent gives evil a face and attempts to 
read its features. 
Important is that AVATAR and FAST are 
screening technologies for sift ing mobile bod-
ies and alerting security operators to potential 
threats. Th e DHS insists that the system does not 
constitute the sole basis for establishing prob-
able cause to conduct a search or make an ar-
rest. Rather, a security operator should decide 
whether or not to further examine an individual 
for further scrutiny on the basis of elevated sus-
picion. But on the ground, one security expert 
insisted during an interview with Maguire that 
FAST should “light up like a Christmas tree” 
(interview 2011) when it encounters malintent. 
Much technoscientifi c thinking is embedded in 
counterterrorist discourses and practices that 
have spread to Europe and elsewhere along the 
routes of the global securityscape, and along 
the way similar or competing systems have 
emerged. Th us proponents of “scientifi c” ap-
proaches to counterterrorism in the UK echo 
their US counterparts in holding that many “ob-
servable” forms of behavior are predicated on a 
form of cognitive “leakage” escaping once the 
load of deception becomes intensifi ed and no 
longer supportable by its carrier. Particularly 
notable here is how such knowledge has become 
codifi ed and reproduced in counterterrorism 
training, oft en through recourse to evolution-
ary psychology, pseudo science, or the legiti-
mating lexicon of medicine. For example, one 
(now retired) senior police offi  cer, then with re-
sponsibility for training colleagues in deception 
identifi cation explained: “We teach our offi  cers 
to look at the feet … when someone is nervous, 
it engages the fl ight or fi ght refl ex. Either way, 
the body naturally starts to pump adrenaline, 
and they will start to shift  their weight from foot 
to foot” (interviewed November 2011). A sup-
posed mimesis of atavistic urges, a return to a 
state of nature, becomes taken as a universal sig-
nifi er of deceit. Other “evidence” for deception 
is drawn from more obvious, retrospectively 
rationalized material as our ethnographic data 
of a counterterrorism training session relays, 
“Th e trainer plays a video of a clearly uncom-
fortable Oliver North being cross-examined by 
a joint congressional committee investigating 
the Iran-Contra aff air in 1987. North is drying 
up under questioning, padding answers with 
pauses and hedges. Aft er the clip concludes, the 
presenter announces that North’s evident dis-
comfort constitutes an expression of several key 
indicators of deception.” Yet the degree to which 
universal properties of deception, or suspicious 
behavior more generally, can be distilled from 
an exceptional event such as this—an individual 
admitting lying to Congress regarding destroy-
ing evidence of breaking an arms embargo with 
Iran to fund atrocities in Central America—is 
questionable. Retrospective theory-building en-
terprises such as these raise a number of endur-
ing issues of evidence and epistemology that 
affl  ict much research and scholarship around 
the identifi cation of malintent. First, such ex-
amples apply a skewed deduction that draws 
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a centripetal fl ow of indicators (“evidence”) 
toward a preordained and already established 
conclusion (“deception”). Such selective post 
hoc rationalization merely confi rms a known 
hypothesis, rather than generating a new one 
(the establishment of whether an individual is 
being deceptive). 
Related is the issue of ecological validity. 
While the limitations of generalizing from a 
congressional hearing to interpersonal com-
munication more generally are obvious, other 
problems of transferability bedevil research in 
this area. As Vrij (2008) and others recognize, 
broader problems of ecological validity—par-
ticularly centering on the use of small samples, 
artifi cial environments, and diffi  culties in repli-
cating the high stakes of terrorist activity—are 
consistent in this fi eld, particularly in relation 
to approaches informed by social psychology. 
Epistemological and ontological concerns fur-
ther undermine many claims of scientifi cally 
validated techniques for isolating suspicious 
behavior or “leaked” traits. For example, there 
is a tendency to assume a shared binary moral 
universe, of good versus evil, where wrongdoers 
are cognizant of their supposed turpitude. Not-
withstanding self-awareness of deceptive be-
havior, such perspectives overlook the sense of 
mission and “just cause” that animate much po-
litical violence and, furthermore, do not with-
stand even basic criminological scrutiny. As 
many ethnographic exercises have exposed, the 
boundary between licit and illicit are less easily 
drawn or perceived by those engaged in trans-
gressive activities. And, as Vrij (2008) notes, the 
most eff ective lies are couched and contextual-
ized in truth. More material challenges to these 
approaches concern issues of effi  cacy. As Mat-
sumoto et al. (2011) argue, despite the claims 
of proponents, behavioral detection training 
based on these principles rarely lead to levels of 
50 percent accuracy in identifying deception; 
thus elevating the availability of coin fl ipping as 
a cheaper and more eff ective alternative.
Nevertheless, crucial here is not level of 
accuracy in spotting deceptive behavior but 
an understanding of the roles and tasks this 
knowledge performs, in terms of positioning 
in “knowledge brokering” roles (Ericson 1994) 
as well as a range of legitimating and identity 
building functions. Th e objectivist ontological 
position here instantiates a particular version 
of the human. Terrorism—commonly spoken 
of as inhuman, barbarous, or evil—is now re-
incorporated into the natural order of things 
as a fundamentally human, albeit abnormal, 
behavior. It follows that counterterrorism be-
comes a matter of skilled professionals sensing 
the abnormal, together with mimetic science 
and technologies attempting to see malintent 
objectively. Consequently, controversial fi elds 
such as the psychology of deceit detection are 
required precisely to add the signatures of ob-
jective science to theories and practices that do 
not meet normal evidential criteria. Th e objec-
tivist ontology of security techno-science insists 
that such signs simply must be available. But the 
questions posed by the theory of malintent can-
not be answered, because the precise theory of 
malintent is classifi ed. Th us what is at stake here 
is a secretive regime of verediction in which ev-
idence serves only to legitimize the continued 
existence of that regime. 
Malintent, then, is a theory of human life that 
emerges from a realm of shadow sovereignty 
with its own secretive criteria for what counts 
as evidence. Objectivist ontological positions 
that include neo-Darwinian theories about all 
human life and a profound infatuation with 
contemporary technology suff use the realm of 
security today. Th is is what the philosopher Gros 
et al. (2008: 5–7) term “a new philosophical an-
thropology” in the age of security. But to under-
stand the cultural reproduction of (in)security 
one must also attend to constructivist subjectiv-
ities and to good and evil.
Constructivist subjectivities 
and the art of counterterrorism
Following the Richard Reid attack in late 2001, 
security experts at Boston’s Logan International 
Airport initiated research that developed into 
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the passenger screening program operated by 
the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), which is similar in kind to programs 
developed simultaneously in Europe and else-
where. Th ese programs developed, bottom up, 
as security experts reacted to the problemati-
zation of terrorism post-9/11 and fl ocked to 
techno-scientifi c ideas. Such programs are an 
uneasy social assemblage of deceit detection, 
crowd behavior analysis, and the strategic de-
ployment of personnel, together with the train-
ing of the senses on the basis of experience. Th e 
initial screening program, developed in the 
early 2000s and implemented during later years, 
was challenged by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) but deemed constitutional on 
the basis that it targeted “elevated suspicion” in 
order to deny access to ”critical infrastructure” 
(Robbins and DiDomenica 2013: 195). Another 
more recent challenge came in 2013, when the 
US Government Accountability Offi  ce (GAO) 
argued that the $900 million spent on the pro-
gram since 2007 did not represent value for 
money, because abnormal behavior detection 
showed an “absence of scientifi cally validated 
evidence” (2013: 1). Th e GAO’s own meta-an-
alytical review of 400 studies conducted over 
six decades revealed that “the human ability to 
accurately identify deceptive behavior based on 
behavioral indicators is the same as or slightly 
better than chance” (2013: 3). However, these 
systems continue to operate. Th e DHS defended 
its program, as noted above, by suggesting that 
scholarly research on deceit is extraneous when 
one’s goal is to detect malintent—the scientifi c 
basis of which is “not typically published in ac-
ademic circles for peer review because of var-
ious security concerns” (2013: 89). Moreover, 
they argued that it is likely that terrorists exhibit 
highly specifi c emotional signals and thus ab-
normal behavior detection targets rare terror-
ists rather than common criminals as part of the 
“critical security capability to defend against our 
adversaries” (2013: 88–93). 
Th us one might reasonably ask: what do ab-
normal behavior detection programs look like 
on the ground? Th e example below is taken 
from Maguire’s notes on counterterrorism 
training deployments in the UK within a pro-
gram developed as a modifi ed version of its US 
counterpart. 
November 2011
I walked out of the conference room in 
the bowels of a regional British airport 
with the twelve other “trainees.” Th is time 
we were looking at the eff ects of adjust-
ing a behavioral environment … [i.e., an 
actual deployment in search for terrorist 
suspects]. Th e uniforms took up position; 
one cradled a sub-machine gun. Five of us 
fanned out and established a covert pat-
tern. Th e system is, of course, cognizant 
of scientifi c ideas about micro-facial ex-
pressions, but aft er numerous successful 
interdictions I could safely say that if the 
suspects were literally faceless they would 
still have been stopped. All were escorted 
away for screening interviews by war-
rant offi  cers and most were subsequently 
arrested for varying off ences, from pos-
session of false documents to smuggling 
and from possession of suspect material 
to excessive quantities of cash. Th en the 
call came through. Th e offi  cers used per-
sonal mobile phones rather than radios. 
Th e more junior trainer came up to me, 
pointed at an information screen while 
saying, “You hear that?” “He’s coming 
up in two minutes.” “I don’t know where 
you stand on this, but to me this man is 
a convicted murderer, and he’s walking 
about like he never saw explosives in his 
life.” “You know there’ll be trouble if we 
stop him—he’s a citizen now, it’s all in 
the past. You … you don’t even think of 
staring.” Out of habit, however, I looked 
at the gaze of my opposite number across 
the hall, and when he redirected his gaze I 
involuntarily looked at the tall, thin, pale 
man. Remarkably, he glared at each mem-
ber of the covert team in turn, smiled at 
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us and walked on. No one spoke. We re-
assembled behind a secure door. “It oft en 
happens,” said the junior trainer. “Th ey 
can see you, and you think you’re hunting 
them!” “It’s usually an ex-service man or 
forces … he was a terrorist!” 
Th ere were no signs of malintent; rather, this 
was a case of a common, former terrorist going 
about his normal business. But in the game of 
hunting for malintent, in which so much relies 
on experience and the training of the senses, 
how are security offi  cers prepared to undertake 
their tasks, and in what ways do they subjec-
tively construct their roles in the world? 
Th e above vignette describes live operations 
that were conducted as part of training that also 
involved workshops on deceit detection. Th ese 
workshops were composed of numerous op-
erational examples, together with discussions 
of psychologist Paul Ekman’s research on how 
deceit might be revealed in micro-facial ex-
pressions. But little attention was really given 
to this notion. Actual policing, the program 
participants understood, required experienced 
police: the key was to know that there was prob-
ably something scientifi c in all of this, out there 
among the academic experts, but “we” should 
recognize and trust the reality of our senses. 
Participants were reminded that this was not 
about “the usual suspects”; profi ling, it was 
plainly stated, was a pointless and amateurish 
activity. Here in the realm of counterterrorism, 
the person harboring malintent could present 
themselves in any possible combination of gen-
der or ethnicity: it was underlying states and 
signs that one had to train oneself to look for. 
Across a number of interviews and multiple 
professional counterterrorism training schemes 
attended by the authors a recurring theme was 
the emphasis on subjectively defi ned notions 
of what is both “normal” for a particular en-
vironment (such as the “normal” pace and di-
rection of crowd fl ows) and the identifi cation 
of “matter out of place.” It is illustrative that a 
repeated and highly infl uential anecdote here is 
presented by Alfred Herrhausen, then chairman 
of Deutsche Bank, murdered in 1989 by indi-
viduals associated with the dying embers of the 
Red Army Faction in West Germany.2 Despite 
traveling in a 2.8 ton armor-plated limousine 
following a continually varied course, Herrhau-
sen was killed by a steel projectile concealed 
and launched in a pannier attached to a bicy-
cle positioned at a “choke point” on his daily 
route. Th e attack was made possible by exten-
sive “hostile reconnaissance” involving RAF 
members posing as construction workers less 
than 500m from Herrhausen’s residence and 
situating the bicycle (conspicuously less than 
100m from permanent cycle racks) six weeks 
before the attack to normalize its presence and 
to observe any interference with the device. In 
counterterrorism circles, learning distilled from 
this event has condensed into advice to follow 
hunches, gut feelings, and the “just doesn’t look 
right” principle. And, of course, the same prin-
ciple extends in modifi ed form to people, or as 
one senior counterterrorism trainer put it suc-
cinctly, it’s about “trusting your instincts, know-
ing when someone is a wee bit odd” (November 
2011). Th is not only works to legitimate and 
embed subjectivities into the delivery of coun-
terterrorism practice, it also serves to institute 
heterogeneous enablers of good circulations 
and pluralize the obstacles to those deemed 
harmful (see Foucault 2007). 
In many programs, counterterrorism train-
ing dwells on screening interviews, and several 
offi  cers will leave the room to prepare truthful 
daily narratives with one fabricating a bogus 
narrative to see who among the remaining train-
ees can spot the cues. Th e trainees generally fail, 
but, of course, such training experiments are not 
“real,” and thus failure is no measure of validity. 
“In reality,” of course, counterterrorism opera-
tions involved mundane knowledge about what 
worked and did not, what actions, positions ad-
opted, or environmental intrusions were likely 
to fl ush out dangerous individuals or groups. 
One learns the skills and acquires the needed 
experiences, and the job means that one uses 
skills, experiences, and instincts to hunt down 
those who intend to harm the innocent. Beyond 
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good and evil, it is understood that the hunter 
and the hunted share sensibilities. Admiration 
may even blossom on either side, but so too do 
cultural imaginaries about specifi c groups and 
about what is natural in human life itself. Today, 
the cultural imaginaries of security experts are 
based on institutional knowledge and subjective 
experiences but also suff used by knowledge em-
anating from new techno-scientifi c projects.
Th eorizing evil and the 
“emergence of emergence”
By the pricking of my thumbs, something 
wicked this way comes.
—Macbeth, Act 4, Scene 1
Since 9/11, hundreds of scholarly studies of 
counterterrorism have been published, and doz-
ens of autobiographies, memoirs, exposés, and 
intellectual treatises have appeared (e.g., Baer 
2003; Pillar 2003; Graham 2008). However, here 
we are interested in the specifi c intellectual out-
puts emanating from counterterrorism. Follow-
ing Feldman (2013), we take the Foucauldian 
term “specifi c intellectual” to denote individu-
als with “a direct and localised relation to sci-
entifi c knowledge and institutions” (Foucault 
1980: 128), individuals in privileged positions 
who can navigate apparatuses and processes but 
who oft en chafe against power relations and feel 
solidarity with those outside. Here we extend 
Feldman’s approach by examining work that is 
both critical and creative, namely Robbins and 
DiDomenica’s Journey from genesis to genocide 
(2013), a remarkable essay on emergence and 
counterterrorism.
Robbins and DiDomenica’s work begins 
with their refl ections on the terrorist attack by 
Richard Reid on American Airlines fl ight 63 in 
December 2001. Robbins was then director of 
aviation security and DiDomenica was direc-
tor of security policy at Boston’s Logan Inter-
national Airport, where fl ight 63 was diverted 
aft er the failed attack. Th e lessons both men 
learned translated into DiDomenica’s key role 
in developing behavioral assessment screen-
ing, later adopted by the TSA, piecemeal by 
UK counterterrorism, and by transport police 
across Europe. But this is not a technical man-
ual. Rather, restating the Manichean universe 
that characterizes the fi eld, the authors set out 
to explore terrorists’ motivations by thinking 
about the evolutionary dimensions of good and 
evil. “How could this happen?” they ask. Th eir 
search for an answer leads them to consider hu-
man nature itself when confronting the terrorist:
[W]e expect to see, literally, at some 
level of consciousness, an ugly Ogre with 
grossly distorted features, including horns 
and a tail. We do this as humans because 
we can’t imagine, even for a moment in 
time, that one human being like us could 
commit such an unspeakable act against 
another. Ultimately, we realise that the an-
swer to the question is even more fright-
ening than an Ogre: It is ourselves. We, 
as human beings, are capable of the most 
heinous, despicable acts against our own 
kind, including genocide. (2013: 63–64)
Th eir work draws together socio-biology, pri-
matology, psychology, and anthropology. Th ey 
review numerous examples and psychological 
experiments and reach the same conclusion as 
Hannah Arendt: evil is banal. Th eir recognition 
of the ordinariness of evil quickly becomes an 
eff ort to “naturalize” terrorists. Terrorism, they 
propose, emerges from hate: a specifi c emotion 
emergent in the interfusion of the “primitive 
survival instincts” of the brain together with 
neocortical planning and rationality (2013: 61).
But how does one search for unknown per-
sons, possessed by hate but otherwise funda-
mentally ordinary? Abnormal behavior detec-
tion becomes the study of “the emergence of 
emergence” (Robbins and DiDomenica 2013: 
15–21), the contemporary scientifi c moment’s 
attention to the “emergent rules of collective be-
havior” and their “fuzzy and probabilistic” 
qualities (2013: 14–15). Again, populating met-
aphors with the natural sciences provides a ve-
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hicle for conceptual legitimation, “Just as we are 
confi dent in walking across a frozen pond based 
on our understanding of the collective behavior 
of water molecules, when looking at groups of 
people, societies, and nations and the interac-
tions between them, understanding the dynam-
ics of behavior and the ability to predict behavior 
will occur principally through emergent rules 
dependent on situational and environmental 
factors” (Robbins and DiDomenica 2013: 21). 
In protecting the critical infrastructures and 
vital systems, counterterrorism deploys behav-
ior detection techno-science and expertise that 
are shaped by and in turn shape paradoxical on-
tologies. On the one hand, one fi nds objectivist 
techno-science with its universalized indicators 
of “abnormal” behavior; on the other hand, one 
fi nds constructivist subjectivities that range 
from hunches to professional imaginaries about 
real and imagined evildoers. But what one also 
fi nds are points of connection and creativity in 
which (in)security is produced and reproduced. 
Techno-scientifi c systems, counterterrorist train-
ing and operations, and specifi c intellectual 
work converge in a naturalization of terrorism 
that includes discourses on the vital nature of 
humanity, expert imaginaries, and specifi c in-
terventions. Discussion of the emergence of 
emergence may seem loft y and removed from 
operational practice, but counterterrorism is 
precisely the kind of problem-space in which 
multilevel discursive and practical work is oc-
curring. In short, to think in evolutionary terms 
about the universal dynamics of human be-
havior and its specifi c situational and environ-
mental factors may also be to contemplate a 
modern airport with its woof and warp of hu-
man activities. In turn, this means that one must 
contemplate natural and normal behavior—the 
idea that crowds have “baseline” behaviors—in 
order to detect matter out of place, persons who 
behave abnormally or are “a wee bit odd.” Th us, 
as DiDomenica explained to the US House of 
Representatives, “a person who is engaged in a 
serious deception … will suff er mental stress, 
fear, or anxiety … manifested through involun-
tary physical and physiological reactions such 
as an increase in heart rate, facial displays of 
emotion, and changes in speed and direction 
of movement” (DiDomenica 2011: 4). But in 
explaining these mysterious cues, he under-
scores a crucial point: counterterrorism is not 
just about arresting terrorists per se; rather, it 
is about facilitating needed mobility while al-
lowing security apparatuses to protect critical 
infrastructure. Good and bad circulations be-
come monitored, delineated, and modulated. 
By elevating the senses and techno-scientifi cally 
searching for objective indicators of malintent 
a new evidential domain emerges around “ele-
vated suspicion” (DiDomenica 2011: 4–9). Th is 
is precisely the domain that the US House of 
Representatives was exploring with DiDomen-
ica and other experts in 2011. At the same time, 
a report by the US National Research Council 
(NRC) was also under consideration, a report 
that argued, “Scientifi c support for linkages 
between behavioral and physiological markers 
and mental state is strongest for elementary 
states (simple emotions, attentional processes, 
states of arousal, and cognitive processes), weak 
for more complex states (deception), and non-
existent for highly complex states (terrorist in-
tent and beliefs)” (NRC 2010 [our emphasis]).
A thin red line
Michel Foucault’s work suff uses contemporary 
security research, especially work on biosecu-
rity, risk, and preparedness. However, Foucault 
attended to security only briefl y during his Col-
lège de France lectures, and then only as a stag-
ing point for studies of governmentality and 
biopolitics. Ultimately, security was to remain 
“a fi eld left  fallow” (Bigo 2008: 93–114). None-
theless, his comments are prescient and fur-
ther illuminate the diverse registers, dispositifs, 
and approaches that constitute the delivery of 
“security.” 
Foucault begins by discussing eighteenth-
century urban planning and the problematiza-
tion of circulation. Apparatuses of security take 
center stage, he proposes, when cities and towns 
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are no longer governed by means of enclosure 
and walls. Faced with the need for liberal gov-
ernment that facilitates the positive circulation 
of persons and things, planners and thinkers—
specifi c intellectuals of various sorts—encoun-
tered potentially “indefi nite series” of elements 
and events (Foucault 2007: 20). Apparatuses 
therefore constitute “milieus” and manage them 
in terms of probabilities, in eff ect naturalizing 
relations between populations, circulations, and 
problematizations in a near future. In such mi-
lieus, crime will never be entirely rooted out, 
threats will be ever present; elements that are 
considered natural cannot be fully suppressed. 
Life itself is therefore the central preoccupation, 
and security is about “allowing circulations to 
take place, of controlling them, sift ing the good 
from the bad, ensuring that things are always in 
movement, constantly moving around, continu-
ally going from one point to another, but in such 
a way that the inherent dangers of this circula-
tion are cancelled out” (Foucault 2007: 65). Se-
curity thus becomes unmoored from traditional 
(sovereign and disciplinary) preoccupations 
with territorial control or regimes of prohibi-
tion and instead focuses on leaving agents, ac-
tors, and fl ows in situ as their mobilities become 
monitored and delineated.
Apparatuses of security, then, from a Fou-
cauldian perspective, clearly inaugurate new 
imaginaries and new concepts, from risk to pre-
caution and from preparedness to prediction. 
Foucault opens an important challenge: to ex-
plore precisely how values like good and evil 
gain currency in security contexts in which hu-
man life itself is naturalized and politicized. Th e 
challenge is to understand how contemporary 
security naturalizes the politics of good versus 
evil (and uses the “natural” and evolutionary to 
undergird politics), thus rendering such seem-
ingly archaic values as points of emergence and 
creativity that animate, legitimate, and give con-
tent to security. 
A broader reading of Foucault’s work on 
security is instructive here. His last essay, Life: 
Experience and science, is important as a state-
ment on emergence and creativity. Th erein he 
returns to the powerful infl uence of his teacher 
Georges Canguilhem and his ideas on the nor-
mal and the abnormal. Canguilhem’s (1979) 
project was to explore how truth claims about 
living beings were constituted in science. He re-
belled against positivist scientifi c treatments of 
life that rendered deviations as abnormal when 
situated against a fi xed version of what is nor-
mal, especially in medical knowledge. For Can-
guilhem “the basic unit” that specifi c forms of 
enlightenment knowledge normalize is “a living 
being in shift ing relations with a changing envi-
ronment” (Rabinow 1998: 195). What is at stake, 
then, is life that is error-prone, fi lled with anom-
alies, and yet caught in the power-knowledge 
web of normalization. Th us “An anomaly is not 
an abnormality,” Canguilhem reminds us, and 
“Diversity does not signify sickness” (quoted 
in Rabinow 1998: 196). Foucault foregrounds 
Canguilhem’s discontinuous history of science 
by focusing on the importance of errors even 
from evolutionary perspectives: “life has led to a 
living being that is never completely in the right 
place, that is destined to ‘err’ and be ‘wrong’” 
(Foucault 1994: 15). Moreover, such persistent 
presence of error leads to its institution into 
practice. Error becomes “the permanent con-
tingency [aléa] around which the history of 
life and the development of human beings are 
coiled,” as Foucault (1994: 16) suggests during 
his refl ection on Canguilhem’s work. 
Paradoxically, although reproduced and in-
tegrated into new practices, error is seen to have 
been eff aced. Signals of hostile intent are ampli-
fi ed and the noise of false positives attenuated. 
Finessed by scientifi c discourses of humanity’s 
core nature, the deployment of techno-science, 
and the application of expert imaginaries, new, 
seemingly more robust forms of knowledge 
come into being. Yet it is useful here to refl ect on 
the residual presence of error. As Foucault fur-
ther notes, “Error is eliminated not by the blunt 
force of a truth that would gradually emerge 
from the shadows but by the formation of a new 
way of ‘truth telling’” (1994: 471). Th us in this 
application for identifying suspicious behavior, 
scientifi c discourse itself does not generate ob-
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jective knowledge that eradicates error through 
unfalsifi able “truths,” but serves to create and 
scaff old new “truths” that freight and institute 
extant errors into practice.
What if normalizing scientifi c knowledge 
and information systems constantly faced rup-
tures and disturbances from error-prone life it-
self? Indeed, building from the data presented 
above, one of our key arguments is that the in-
creasing presence of intuition and subjectivity in 
counterterrorism is crucial to the diversifi cation 
and instantiation of error into such practices.
Foucault establishes the task of exploring 
“the relationship between life and the under-
standing (connaissance) of life” by tracing and 
attending to “the thin red line of the presence 
of value and of the norm” (1994: 14). Amoore 
(2013: 149) proposes that emergence is there-
fore central to “security techniques that seek out 
the emergent threat pre-emptively in the form 
itself, long before it is actualized.” In doing so, 
this emphasis on futurity performs multiple 
functions during the present. Adey and Ander-
son (2011: 1096) note, for example, that “antic-
ipatory action promises to secure a valued life 
and this makes present a good future of safety, 
protection, and care.” Th is temporal compres-
sion between the present and the future is also 
recognized by others. But a broader reading 
of Foucault is also available in Paul Rabinow’s 
work on the contemporary, “a moving ratio of 
modernity, moving through the recent past 
and near future in a (non-linear) space” (Rab-
inow 2007: 2), which Rabinow understands as 
an ontological problem space. Building on this 
observation, it is the contemporary ontological 
problem space of counterterrorism, replete with 
its paradoxical strains, which we have attempted 
to explore in this article.
Conclusions: Sensing evil 
and reproducing (in)security
Today, security apparatuses cross nation-state 
boundaries and blur the lines between institu-
tions and agencies, governments and private 
corporations. Security may be a new name for 
long-standing state violence in many parts of 
the world, but it is also a site of new techno-
scientifi c assemblages and forms of expertise 
that seek to know and manage the near future. 
In this article, we have drawn on our ethno-
graphic research on counterterrorism as well as 
analysis of expert documents and an overview 
of important trends in counterterrorist techno-
science to stake out a number of claims. First, 
counterterrorism as a contemporary site of (in)se-
curitization includes both objectivist techno-
science—which targets universalized indicators 
of abnormal behavior and terrorist malintent—
and constructivist subjectivities that stretch from 
hunches and suspicions to imaginaries about 
battles between good and evil. Our goal has been 
to point to the ways in which techno-science 
and constructivist subjectivities compete, are 
paradoxical, yet nest together in the problem-
space of contemporary counterterrorism. And 
in this problem-space one fi nds the emergence 
of machines for mimetically acting upon hu-
man nature and professional experts theorizing, 
constructing, and acting upon broadly similar 
ideas about human life itself. Little if any scien-
tifi c evidence is available to support the claims 
of counterterrorism techno-science or the con-
structivist subjectivities of many experts. Instead, 
as Foucault (2007) proposed, one sees security 
constructing milieus and naturalizing processes 
and patterns therein. However, whereas Fou-
cault glossed the values emergent in security 
contexts, here we have shown that seemingly 
archaic values such as good and evil are central 
to the contemporary naturalization and biopo-
liticization of security. Today, security experts 
imagine the potential horrors of the near future 
and develop technologies and work to heighten 
senses to protect the innocent against evil. In 
so doing, evil has become less a philosophical 
question of the frighteningly normal, to bor-
row from Hannah Arendt, and more a matter of 
naturalizing the abnormal such that it becomes 
knowable through mysterious signs. In the se-
cretive world of counterterrorism, then, one 
fi nds in notions like good and evil what Gilles 
Deleuze terms “points of emergence or creativ-
ity” (1988: 35). 
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Much of this article has explored points of 
emergence in contemporary realms of (in)se-
curity from US techno-science to UK counter-
terrorism deployments. Many of our arguments 
point to the importance of evidence or the lack 
thereof in security discourses and practices. In-
deed, it is precisely evidence that threatens the 
shadowy edifi ce of counterterrorism. Th e emer-
gence of emergence in security expertise trou-
bles the very relations of evidence and the world, 
inaugurating new concepts and a new philo-
sophical anthropology. Just as Gilles Deleuze in 
his discussion of contemporary societies of con-
trol drew on Franz Kafk a’s Th e Trial to explore 
the “limitless postponement” characteristic of 
systems that disregard truth and evidence, one 
might refl ect on how Kafk a approached good 
and evil, in the sense of “stripping all that is be-
coming to a man except his abstract humanity” 
(Trilling 1955: 39). It is this Kafk aesque image of 
evil that is emergent between techno-science and 
constructivist subjectivities in counterterrorism 
today. Counterterrorism does not target beasts 
or ogres but rather abstract, and abstracted, ver-
sions of human life itself.
Mark Maguire is head of the Maynooth Univer-
sity Department of Anthropology. He twice held 
visiting professorships in the Department of 
Anthropology, Stanford University, California. 
From 2010 to 2014 he edited the international 
journal Social Anthropology and is co-editor of 
Th e Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from 
the Frontline of Policing, Counterterrorism, and 
Border Control (Pluto, 2014). 
Email: Mark.H.Maguire@nuim.ie 
Pete Fussey is professor of Sociology at the 
University of Essex. He has published widely 
in a number of areas, including terrorism and 
counterterrorism, critical studies of resilience, 
major-event security, surveillance and society, 
organized crime and urban sociology. He is co-
author of Securing and Sustaining the Olympic 
City (Ashgate, 2011) and co-editor of Terrorism 
and the Olympics (Routledge, 2010). 
Email: pfussey@essex.ac.uk
Notes
 1. Here we use “ontology” in a rather straight-
forward manner that does not directly engage 
with current disciplinary discussions. Instead, 
we are simply concerned to unpack the “real” 
that exists for security operators or the always-
constructed realm of human (ethical) action 
within which they exist, together with its non-
human and inhuman actors and actants, from 
techno-science to terrorists. Moreover we are 
interested in openness to that which lies be-
yond, the limits of knowledge, and the penum-
bral as sources of emergence.
 2. Th e anecdote was relayed to Pete Fussey during 
separate interviews with senior London-based 
private-sector security counterterrorism agents 
(May 2010, August 2011, and February 2012).
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